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The Military Justice System and
the Right to Trial by Jury: Size




By Frank J. Chmelik*
Introduction
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury
... .'" The Supreme Court has defined the right to a jury trial in
criminal prosecutions and has mandated a standard applicable in
all jurisdictions in the country save one: the military justice sys-
tem. The exception is significant when one considers that the mili-
tary justice system is the judicial system for over two million mem-
bers of the armed forces, making it the thirty-second largest
jurisdiction in the country.2 Even within the realm of military jus-
tice, the lack of a constitutionally protected right to a jury trial in
criminal prosecutions is significant since most other Sixth Amend-
ment rightss and most other Bill of Rights guarantees are afforded
* B.A., 1978, Claremont Men's College; member, third year class.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. See Cook, Courts-Martial: The Third System in American Criminal Law, 1978 S.
ILL. L.J. 1.
3. Many Sixth Amendment rights are found both in case'law and in the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1979 & Supp. 1980). See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1937); 10 U.S.C. § 846 (1979 & Supp. 1980) (right to counsel); United States v.
Houshell, 7 C.M.A. 3, 21 C.M.R. 129 (1956); 10 J.S.C. § 810 (1979 & Supp. 1980) (speedy
trial); United States v. Mercier, 5 M.J. 866 (A.F.C.M.R. 1978); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MAN-
UAL FOR Couns-MARrTAL I 53e (rev. ed. 1969) (public trial); United States v. Clay, 1 C.M.A.
74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951); 10 U.S.C. § 830(b) (1979 & Supp. 1980) (right to be informed of the
accusation); United States v. Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960) (confrontation);
United States v. Iturralde-Aponte, 1 M.J. 196, 198 (C.M.A. 1975) (compulsory service of
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to members of the armed forces.'
Historically, the American military justice system, as regulated
by the Uniform Code of Military Justice,5 has conducted criminal
prosecutions in a court-martial system in which a panel sits both
as jury and as determiners of sentence.' This system is based on an
Anglo-American tradition which has long recognized the need for a
separate system of criminal justice for members of the armed
forces.
Civilian criminal justice is designed in the main to deter individu-
als from abnormal or unconventional behavior in communities
where there are few, if any, restrictions on, for example, their
freedom to travel, or their selection of employment, residence or
mode of dress. Military justice, on the other hand, is designed to
control individuals in very peculiar circumstances, such as com-
bat, and to require from them the performance of oftentimes dis-
agreeable and undesirable tasks. The soldier may not go where
and when he pleases; he may not choose his job or quit if he
doesn't like what he is ordered to do; he lives under abnormal
conditions; and he is told what to wear. In short, the military jus-
tice system is designed to implement discipline as well as to pun-
ish obvious criminal conduct
The United States Supreme Court early on adopted this rea-
soning, allowing the military to conduct trials, "courts-martial" as
they are called in the military, in a manner and form substantially
different from that required in the federal system. As late as 1957,
in Reid v. Covert,8 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Black,
stated in a footnote that "[t]he exception in the Fifth Amendment,
of course, provides that grand jury indictment is not required in
cases subject to military trial and this exception has been read over
into the Sixth Amendment so that the requirements of jury trial
are inapplicable."" That footnote quoted the 1942 wartime case, Ex
parte Quirin,10 whose underlying principle has never subsequently
been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court.1'
process). See also Cooper, The Sixth Amendment and Military Criminal Law, 84 Mm. L.
Rzv. 41, 52 (1979).
4. See generally W. SCHUG, UNrrm STATES LAW AND THE ARmED FORCES (1972);
Pearl, The Applicability of the Bill of Rights to a Court-Martial Proceeding, 50 J. CrM. L.
559 (1960); Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181 (1962).
5. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1979 & Supp. 1980).
6. Id. § 816.
7. W. SCHUG, supra note 4, at 123.
8. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
9. Id. at 37 n.68.
10. 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942).
11. The appellate courts of the military justice system have commented frequently on
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As early as 1866, the Court stated in general terms that the
military has the "same responsibilities as do the federal courts to
protect a person from a violation of his constitutional rights." 12 In
another footnote in Reid the Supreme Court stated that:
[T]he Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of
its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all cir-
cumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences,
was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provi-
sions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government.13
Despite this language the Court has not considered the issue in
over two decades.
Contrasted with the general lack of discussion by the Supreme
Court of trial by jury in the military, the Court has commented
extensively in the past decade on the role and necessity of jury
trials in the scheme of American criminal jurisprudence.
14
This note will explore the relationship between the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury, as defined in recent Supreme
Court cases, and jury trials in the military justice system. It will
focus on the size and voting requirements of the general court-
martial panel, which is referred to as the "court", where they apply
the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.15 Recogniz-
ing that the military holds criminal certain militaty offenses affect-
ing discipline that would not be criminal in.the civilian context,
the scope of this note is limited to offenses that would have been
tried in civilian courts had they been committed outside of mili-
tary jurisdiction: civilian offenses."
This note will suggest that with some minor variations in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice the system could operate within
the guidelines established by the recent jury trial cases and still
accomplish the stated objectives of the system.
the constitutionality of the present system. See United States v. Kemp, 22 C.M.A. 152, 154,
46 C.M.R. 152, 154 (1973); United States v. Culp, 14 C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963);
United States v. Montgomery, 5 M.J. 832 (A.C.M.R. 1978); United States v. Rice, 3 M.J.
1094 (N.C.M.R. 1977).
12. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
13. 354 U.S. at 35 n.62 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 120-21).
14. See, e.g., Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223
(1978); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
15. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1979 & Supp. 1980).
16. "Civilian offenses" is a term used to describe those crimes that one generally con-
siders crimes in any jurisdiction. See Note, Courts-Martial Jurisdiction Over Members of
Armed Forces for "Civilian" Offenses, 14 A.L.R. FaD. 152, 158 n.4 (1973).
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I. The Constitutional Standard-Trial by Jury
The right to trial by jury, guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment, is fundamental to the American system of justice. 17 Alexis
de Tocqueville, the noted eighteenth century political observer,
said: "The institution of the jury ... places the real direction of
society in the hands of the governed, or of a portion of the gov-
erned, and not in that of the government .... He who punishes
the criminal is . . . the real master of society.""
Early on the Supreme Court applied the Sixth Amendment to
the federal system requiring a jury of twelve and a unanimous ver-
dict for all criminal convictions. The Court and legal scholars con-
sider the size and voting requirements in the federal system an his-
torical accident,l" and over the past fifty years have been defining
the parameters of the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury.
In Duncan v. Louisiana,0 a 1968 decision involving a nineteen
year old black man who had been convicted of simple battery
before a Louisiana magistrate without the beniefit of a jury, the
Supreme Court considered the origins of the right to trial by jury,
noting that:
by the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in criminal
cases had been in existence in England for several centuries and
carried impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta.
Its preservation and proper operation as a protection against ar-
bitrary rule were among the major objectives of the revolutionary
settlement which was expressed in the Declaration and Bill of
Rights of 1689.21
Additionally, the Court noted the importance of the right to trial
by jury to the American system of jurisprudence:
The Declaration of Independence stated solemn objections to the
King's making "Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the ten-
ure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their sala-
ries," to his "depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial
by Jury," and to his "transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for
17. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16, 18-19 (1955); Thompson
v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1898); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 122-23; 3 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES* 379; 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW* 3-10; THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 83 (A. Hamilton).
18. A. DE TOCQtEvILLE, DEMOCRACY iN AmEMCA 282-83 (H. Reeve Trans. 1948).
19. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 89 (1970). See also P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JuRY
8 (1956); F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AmEmMur 64 (1951); W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW (1903); Thayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5 HARv. L. REV. 295 (1892);
Wells, The Origin of the Petty Jury, 27 L.Q. REv. 347 (1911).
20. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).




After extensively documenting the origins of jury trials, the Court
determined that the right to a jury trial "is a fundamental right,
essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring
that fair trials are provided for all defendants. '2 The Court ex-
tended the right to trial by jury to the state courts via the Four-
teenth Amendment, and went on in succeeding cases to define that
right.
The year after Duncan, the Court ruled in Baldwin v. New
York24 that the right to a jury trial was mandated by the Sixth
Amendment for all serious crimes, whereas petty crimes could be
tried without a jury. The Court went on to state that petty offenses
for purposes of the right to trial by jury, were those in which the
punishment was limited to imprisonment for less than six months.
On the same day the Court announced its decision in Baldwin,
it decided Williams v. Florida,2 5 which upheld a Florida conviction
based on a rule allowing six member juries for non-capital offenses.
The Court cited Duncan in stating that a twelve member jury was
probably an historical accident. The Court also reaffirmed Duncan
in stating that the "essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the
interposition between the accused and his accuser of the common-
sense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community par-
ticipation and shared responsibility that results from that group's
determination of guilt or innocence." 26 The Court recognized the
goals of jury deliberation and found that the goals "are [not] in
any meaningful sense less likely to be achieved when the jury num-
bers six, than when it numbers twelve-particularly if the require-
ment of unanimity is retained. 2 7 It is important to note that the
Court in Williams only upheld the six member jury rule as meet-
ing constitutional standards. It expressly declined to rule on what
minimum number of jurors would pass constitutional muster, leav-
ing that key question for future Court determination.
Like Williams, the 1972 case of Apodaca v. Oregon,28 provided
some definition but no definitive standard for the Sixth Amend-
ment's right to trial by jury. The Court in Apodaca, in an opinion
written by Justice White, who also wrote for the majority in Wil-
22. Id. at 152-53.
23. Id. at 157-58.
24. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
25. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
26. Id. at 100.
27. Id.
28. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
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liams v. Florida, considered the convictions of Robert Apodaca,
Henry Morgan Cooper, Jr., and James Arnold Madden. They were
convicted before separate Oregon juries, all of which returned less
than unanimous verdicts. The vote in the cases of Apodaca and
Madden was eleven to one, while the vote in the case of Cooper
was ten to two, the minimum requisite vote under Oregon law for
sustaining a conviction. 9 The Supreme Court followed the lead of
the Williams decision in looking to history to determine if unanim-
ity was a necessary ingredient for conviction.
The most salient fact in the scanty history of the Sixth Amend-
ment, which we reviewed in full in Williams, is that, as it was
introduced by James Madison in the House of Representatives,
the proposed Amendment provided for trial "by an impartial jury
of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for
conviction, of the right of challenge, and other accustomed
requisites ... "30
The draft quoted in Apodaca was not accepted by the Senate and
eventually Congress provided only for trial "[b]y an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been com-
mitted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law.' "31 The Apodaca majority considered the deletion of the "req-
uisite of unanimity" as an explicit rejection of that concept by the
Framers. The Court concluded that there is
no difference between juries required to act unanimously and
those permitted to convict or acquit by votes of 10 to two or 11 to
one. . . . "[fln either case, the interest of the defendant in hav-
ing the judgment of his peers interposed between himself and
that of the State who prosecute and judge him is equally well
served.3
2
Ballew v. Georgia," decided in 1978, was a landmark case
which provided a definitive standard for a constitutionally suffi-
cient jury. Claude Ballew was convicted in 1973, by a jury of five,
of distributing obscene material. The Georgia Constitution permit-
ted juries of five persons for certain offenses, including offenses
carrying a maximum penalty of one year imprisonment.u The Su-
preme Court noted that in Williams v. Florida it had held that a
jury of six was constitutional but had expressly reserved the issue
of whether a number smaller than six passed constitutional scru-
29. Id. at 406.
30. Id. at 409.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 411.
33. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
34. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 16.
[Vol. 8:617
tiny. The Court decided in Ballew that:
The purpose and functioning of the jury in a criminal trial is seri-
ously impaired, and to a constitutional degree, by a reduction in
size to below six members. We readily admit that we do not pre-
tend to discern a clear line between six members and five. But the
assembled data raise substantial doubt about the reliability and
appropriate representation of panels smaller than six.35
The Ballew decision was based in large part on a variety of
statistical and psychological studies concerning the reliability of
juries which were conducted in the 1970's. The Court set forth sev-
eral reasons for concluding that six members was the minimum
number of jurors necessary for a constitutionally sufficient trial by
jury. The Court found that "recent empirical data suggest that
progressively smaller juries are less likely to foster effective group
deliberation,"3 6 and that "the data now raise doubts about the ac-
curacy of the results achieved by smaller and smaller panels. Sta-
tistical studies suggest that the risk of convicting an innocent per-
son rises as the size of the jury diminishes,"37 and that "the data
suggest that the verdicts of jury deliberation in criminal cases will
vary as juries become smaller,... the variance amounts to an im-
balance to the detriment of one side, the defense."3 8 The Court
decided in Ballew, based on numerous scientific studies, to define a
clear constitutional standard. Six jurors are the minimum number
necessary for a constitutionally sufficient jury.a9
After Ballew there remained one question in the definition of
the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury: must all members of a
six-member jury agree on conviction? The Court addressed this
question in the 1979 case of Burch v. Louisiana,40 finding that six-
member juries must be unanimous in order to return a guilty ver-
dict. The Court in Burch began its opinion by reviewing its hold-
ings in Williams v. Florida and Duncan v. Louisiana. The Court
noted its previous reliance on scientific studies when it stated:
much the same reasons that led us in Ballew to decide that use of
a five-member jury threatened the fairness of the proceeding and
the proper role of the jury, lead us to conclude now that convic-
35. 435 U.S. at 239.
36. Id. at 232.
37.' Id. at 234.
38. Id. at 236.
39. Id. at 244-45. The Court did not reach this decision without first considering the
arguments of the State of Georgia. The state's claim that five jurors were more cost efficient
than six was said to be of minimal value and provided little justification for the proposed
sacrifice in jury reliability.
40. 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
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tion for a nonpetty offense by only five members of a six-person
jury presents a similar threat to preservation of the substance of
the jury trial guarantee and justifies our requiring verdicts ren-
dered by six-person juries to be unanimous.4'
The Court in Burch finally and definitely set the constitu-
tional standard for the right to trial by jury in the United States.
Interestingly, the standard defined by the Court in Ballew and
Burch was less restrictive than the standard already in use in every
state except Louisiana and Oklahoma.42
From Duncan v. Louisiana in 1968 through Burch v. Louisi-
ana in 1979, the Court had engaged in a line drawig process. The
boundary was set at a unanimous six-member jury largely as a re-
suit of reliance on the near-uniform practices in state jurisdictions
and the post-1970 studies of jury size and group deliberation. The
Court recognized the arbitrariness of the line drawing process
when it stated in Duncan that "although essential [the line draw-
ing process] cannot be wholly satisfactory, for it requires attaching
different consequences to events which, when they lie near the line,
actually differ very little."43 Nevertheless the line is clear. The
right to trial by jury is satisfied only by juries with at least six
members voting for conviction.
The constitutional standard derived by the Court for the right
to trial by jury is stricter than the size and voting requirements
used in the military justice system. However, the question still re-
mains as to how that standard should be applied to the military
justice system, if at all. Before one can analyze the impact of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment on the
military justice system, it is necessary to outline that system and
then evaluate the probable effect of the imposition of the constitu-
tional standard.
II. The Uniform Code of Military Justice
The military justice system is a separate system of criminal
justice created by Congress pursuant to article I, section 8, clause
14 of the United States Constitution.44 There has been much de-
41. Id. at 133.
42. Id. at 134. The Court pointed to this fact in further justification of its delineating
the line between those jury practices that are constitutionally permissible and those that are
not.
43. 391 U.S. at 161.
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 states in part that Congress possesses the power "tt]o make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
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bate as to the origins of clause 14 of section 8 and whether the
clause confers on Congress the power to try members of the armed
forces for civilian offenses. The majority of research,45 and, more
importantly, Supreme Court decisions, 4 hold the view that clause
14 does vest that power in Congress with some jurisdictional
limitations.
Pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Constitution,
Congress has enacted laws governing military justice,47 and in 1951
it enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).4e The
UCMJ deals exclusively with military law as distinguished from
martial law or the law of war.49 Military law is the law which pro-
vides the basic legal structure, including jurisdiction over common
crimes, for members of the armed forces. It is distinguished from
martial law which is a military administered civilian system and
the law of war which is an area of international law dealing with
countries at war and their combatants.
50
The military justice system is administered pursuant to two
basic sources. The UCMJ is incorporated into title 10 of the
United States Code. It defines criminal conduct, establishes the va-
rious courts-martial and sets forth the basic procedures used in the
military justice system. The UCMJ gives the President the author-
ity to promulgate additional procedures for military criminal pro-
45. Nelson, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses: An
Analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker, 54 MINN. L. Rav. 1, 21 (1969).
46. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
47. Prior to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) the Army was governed by
the Articles of War, Chapter 11 of the National Defense Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 40 Stat.
787 (as amended 10 U.S.C. § 1471). The Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 648, 62 Stat. 1014, ex-
tended the Articles of War to the then newly created United States Air Force. The Articles
for the Government of the Navy were set forth in 50 U.S.C. §§ 551-736 (repealed 1956),
primarily deriving from the Act of July 17, 1862, itself tracing back to the Act of July 1,
1797. These articles, with minor changes, were valid until the UCMJ went into effect. For
further discussion see generally W. SCHUG, note 4 supra.
48. The Uniform Code of Military Justice was created by the Act of May 5, 1950, ch.
169, § 1, 64 Stat. 108 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 (1979 & Supp. 1980)) which superseded
both the Articles for the Government of the Navy and the Articles of War as they apply to
all the armed forces.
49. The military administers martial law over civilian populations in times of great
unrest or national emergency. Since martial law is an extraordinary application of govern-
ment power, it bears little practical relation to military justice. The law of war is a portion
of international law that deals with the rights and duties of nations and individual combat-
ants during hostilities. For example, in Ex parte Quirin the Supreme Court held that eight
spies (one of whom may have been an American citizen) who were landed from a German
submarine into the United States during World War H1, could be tried by a military court
according to the laws of war. See Nelson, supra note 45, at 21.
50. Id.
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ceedings. Presidents have utilized 'this authority to publish the
Manual for Courts-Martial,1 which was last revised in 1969, and,
for example, amended by former President Carter in 1977.52 The
Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) sets forth in exacting detail
the process for application of the UCMJ. For example, the duties
of all parties as well as the rules of evidence for military trials are
outlined in the MCM.
The UCMJ is also the statutory basis for offenses punishable
in the military justice system. Offenses fall into two general catego-
ries: military offenses and civilian offenses. Military offenses are
those acts which become crimes because of the accused's status as
a member of the armed "forces,53 and usually concern a breach of
duty or a breach of the chain-of-command. For example, article 86
of the UCMJ makes it a crime for a member of the armed forces to
be absent "from his unit, organization, or place of duty at which he
is required to be at the time prescribed."" Clearly an article 86
offense is a uniquely military offense. What would be grounds for
reprimand or possibly dismissal from a civilian job is a serious
criminal offense punishable by imprisonment according to the
UCMJ. Article 89 of the UCMJ makes criminal any behavior mani-
festing disrespect toward a superior commissioned officer. 55 Again
article 89 creates a uniquely military offense designed to preserve
the military chain-of-command 6 and would find no place in a civil-
51. U.S. DEP'T OF DMENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (Rev. ed. 1969) (published
pursuant to Exec. Order No. 11476, 34 Fed. Reg. 10502 (1969)) [hereinafter cited as MCM].
52. Exec. Order No. 12018, 42 Fed. Reg. 57943 (1977) (This amendment of Nov. 3,
1977, set forth a clear chain of command authority for use by members of the American
armed forces taken prisoner of war). See also 18 U.S.C. § 13 which assimilates state law
under certain circumstances.
53. See generally Note, Courts-Martial Jurisdiction Over Members of the Armed
Forces for "Civilian" Offenses, 14 A.L.R. FED. 152 (1973).
54. 10 U.S.C. § 886 (1979 & Supp. 1980) (art. 86-Absence Without Leave): "Any
member of the armed forces who, without authority-
(1) Fails to go to his appointed place of duty at the time prescribed;
(2) Goes from that place; or
(3) Absents himself or remains absent from his unit, organization, or place of duty
at which he is required to be at the time prescribed;
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."
55. 10 U.S.C. § 889 (1979) (art. 89.-Disrespect Toward A Superior Commissioned Of-
ficer): "Any person subject to this chapter who behaves with disrespect toward his superior
commissioned officer shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."
56. "Chain-of-command" is a term of art describing the statutory authority of the mil-
itary starting with the Commander-in-Chief, the President of the United States, and ex-
tending down to the lowest ranking private. Theoretically, a recruit can name the twenty or
so individuals extending from his squad leader to the President. The term is sometimes
used in the broader sense to refer to everyone of a higher rank.
[Vol. 8:617
ian criminal code.
There are also offenses listed in the UCMJ which one finds in
almost any criminal code, that are malum in se offenses and vio-
late general societal rules. For example, article 118 of the UCMJ
makes "any person ... who, without justification or excuse, un-
lawfully kills a human being... guilty of murder '57 punishable by
sentence of death in the military courts. 58 Other typically civilian
offenses are manslaughter, robbery, forgery, rape, larceny, assault
and burglary.59 Although the need for military discipline is an indi-
rect justification for inclusion of these offenses in the UCMJ, the
overriding justification is that society as a whole decries these of-
fenses and demands that their perpetrators be punished.
The UCMJ includes a broad "general article": article 134,
which provides that "crimes and offenses not capital, of which per-
sons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cogni-
zance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according
to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at
the discretion of the court." 0 Article 134 encompasses both mili-
tary and civilian offenses. The MCM, commenting on article 134,
states that
[c]rimes and offenses not capital which are referred to and made
punishable by Article 134 include those acts or omissions, not
made punishable by another Article, which are denounced as non-
capital crimes or offenses by enactments of Congress or under au-
thority of Congress and made triable in the Federal civil courts.61
Article 134, according to the MCM, acts as an assimilation statute
encompassing all noncapital federal offenses.62
Many of the offenses in the UCMJ could fall into either the
military or civilian category, depending on the circumstances. For
example, if a member of the armed forces violates article 128,6s by
assaulting a member of his same military unit, the offense would so
greatly affect discipline that it is arguably military. However, if
that same member of the armed forces, in the privacy of his gov-
57. 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1979) (art. 118-Murder).
58. Id.
59. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
60. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1979 & Supp. 1980) (art. 134-General Article).
61. MCM, supra note 51, 213(e), at 28-73.
62. For example, article 134 incorporated into the UCMJ the Narcotic Drugs Import
and Export Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 171-185 (repealed 1970), making illegal the importation of
proscribed drugs not only into areas over which the United States is sovereign but also into
territories subject to the control of the United States for a special purpose, including a
military installation on foreign soil.
63. 10 U.S.C. § 928 (1979 & Supp. 1980) (art. 128-Assault).
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ernment supplied on-post housing, assaults his visiting friend, the
effect on discipline would be less direct and the offense would be-
come arguably civilian. On its face the UCMJ is extremely broad,
encompassing purely military and purely civilian offenses, and in
many cases offenses can be both military and civilian depending on
the circumstances of the violation.
The punishments for all offenses listed in the UCMJ are also
contained in the code. Interestingly, the severity of the punish-
ments; which may range from a verbal administrative reprimand,
to confinement at hard labor, or even to death; are limited not only
by the offense, but by the type of court-martial before which the
accused is tried. Article 56 of the UCMJ states that "[tjhe punish-
ment which a court-martial may direct for an offense may not ex-
ceed such limits as the President may prescribe for that offense.""
The President has prescribed those limits in chapter 25 of the
MCM.e5 There are three levels of courts-martial; however, only the
general court-martial has the authority to sentence an individual
to more than six months confinement.6 Since the Supreme Court
in Baldwin v. New York has stated that the fundamental right to
trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment attaches only to
crimes where imprisonment for more than six months is author-
ized,6 7 the general courts-martial are the only military courts where
the right to trial by jury is potentially applicable.
II. The Courts-Martial
The general court-martial is the most formal method of trial
in the military justice system. Generally, only serious offenses are
brought before it and only after rather involved preliminaries.
General courts-martial have the power to try any person subject to
the UCMJ for any offenses made punishable by the code; however,
in practice a majority of minor offenses are handled administra-
tively,"8 or by a lesser court-martial.
A criminal offense is originally brought to the attention of the
64. Id. § 856 (1979 & Supp. 1980) (art. 56-Maximum Limits).
65. MCM, supra note 51, at ch. 25.
66. There are three types of courts-martial in the military. Summary courts-martial
involve only confinement for up to one month, special courts-martial involve confinement
for up to six months, and general courts-martial involve any punishment not forbidden by
the UCMJ. Additionally, each court has various administrative sanctions available including
restrictions, forfeitures of pay, hard labor, and, in the case of the special or general courts, a
bad conduct discharge. See W. SCHUG, supra.note 4, at 220.
67. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
68. See 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1979 & Supp. 1980) (art. 15-Non-judicial Punishment).
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accused's commanding officer. In the case of minor offenses, where
the potential penalty is less than one year, the company com-
mander can impose purely administrative punishment by removing
certain privileges granted the serviceman.6 9 Alternatively, with the
consent of the accused, he can impose non-judicial punishment
pursuant to article 15 of the UCMJ.70 Article 15's purpose is pri-
marily corrective. 1 It vests the power of punishment in the local
commander who is able to enforce discipline directly and to punish
while taking into account numerous factors about which he is
knowledgeable. Additionally, it allows quick disposition of minor
offenses at the local level. If the accused refuses punishment under
article 15, or if the offense is too serious for non-judicial punish-
ment, the company commander or any superior officer in the
chain-of-command can prefer charges under article 30 of the
UCMJ, and initiate a formal court-martial proceeding.
The summary court-martial is the lowest level court-martial,
both in terms of the sentence that may be imposed and the legal
formalities required.72 It is an administrative rather than judicial
proceeding conducted by a single commissioned officer. The presid-
ing officer acts as judge, factfinder, prosecutor and defense counsel.
He is appointed by the post or division commander and need not
be an attorney. The presiding officer must inform the accused of
the charges and the name of the accuser and call all witnesses
whom he or the accused desires to call." Additionally, the accused
must be informed of his right to remain silent, can cross-examine
all witnesses, may testify and present evidence including a mitiga-
ting statement in his own defense. However, since it is an adminis-
69. For example, living off-post in private housing is a privilege for certain lower rank-
ing enlisted members of the armed forces.
70. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1979 & Supp. 1980) (art. 15-Non-judicial Punishment).
71. The Manual for Courts-Martial, paragraph 132, reads in part that "[e]xcept in the
case of a person attached to or embarked in a vessel, punishment may not be imposed under
Article 15 upon any member of the armed forces who has, before the imposition of the
punishment under that article, demanded trial by court-martial in lieu of the punishment
thereunder." MCM, supra note 51, at 26-28. See also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 750
(1974) for a good explanation of the article 15 procedure and sentencing.
72. "The summary court-martial occupies a position between informal nonjudicial dis-
position under Art. 15 and the courtroom type procedure of the general and special courts-
martial." Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 32 (1976). Its purpose as stated in the MCM, is
to provide "justice promptly for relatively minor offenses under a simple form of proce-
dure." MCM, supra note 51, at 14-1. Like the procedure under article 15 it requires the
approval of the accused. If objection to trial by summary court-martial is made by the ac-
cused, trial is then ordered in either a special or general court-martial. 10 U.S.C. § 820
(1979) (art. 20-Jurisdiction of Summary Courts-Martial).
73. See MCM, supra note 51, at 14-2.
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trative proceeding, the accused has no right to counsel. 4 According
to article 20 of the UCMJ, the maximum sentences which may be
imposed by summary courts-martial are 45 days hard labor with-
out confinement; 30 days hard labor with confinement; two months
restriction to a specified area, the company area for example; re-
duction in grade to the lowest enlisted pay grade; and forfeiture of
two-thirds pay for one month.7 5
The special court-martial has jurisdiction to hear all noncapi-
tal offenses; however, the maximum penalties 6 that can be im-
posed by the special court are six months confinement or hard la-
bor without confinement for three months; forfeiture of up to two-
thirds pay per month for six months; and/or a bad conduct dis-
charge. The special court consists of three or more court mem-
bers and a military judge. The accused is provided military counsel
and the case is prosecuted by a military legal officer, commonly
called a trial counsel.78
The court of general jurisdiction in the military is the general
court martial. It has, according to the UCMJ, jurisdiction to "try
persons... for any offense made punishable by this chapter...,
under such limitations as the President may prescribe, adjudge any
punishment not forbidden by this chapter, including the penalty of
death.' 17 9 The general court-martial is the trial court of the mili-
tary and is the court where all serious offenses are tried. The gen-
eral courts-martial and special courts-martial are judicial as op-
posed to administrative proceedings. Between the two, the only
difference is in the severity of punishment that may be adjudged
and the number of court members.
The Supreme Court, in defining those instances where a right
to a trial by jury is a fundamental right, has looked to the poten-
tial penalty.8 0 If the requirement of trial by jury were applied to
the military justice system, the general court-martial would defi-
nitely fall into the area where the jury trial is constitutionally
mandated. The special court-martial, on the other hand, has juris-
diction over those offenses which would be classified by the Su-
74. See generally Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976).
75. 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1979) (art. 20-Jurisdiction of Summary Courts-Martial).
76. MCM, supra note 51, at 4-5.
77. According to paragraph 15(b) of the MCM, a bad conduct discharge cannot be
adjudged unless a military judge presides over the trial and a verbatim record of that trial is
kept. An exception to the requirement of a military judge is made when a "military judge
could not be detailed because of physical conditions or military exigencies." Id. I 15(b).
78. Id. at 9-11, -12. See also id. at 9-6.
79. 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1979) (art. 18-Jurisdiction of General Courts-Martial).
80. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
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preme Court as petty, and thus would not be held to the require-
ments of trial by jury. Consequently, when one considers the
application of the fundamental right of trial by jury to the military
justice system, one is actually considering the application of trial
by jury to the general courts-martial.
Once charges have been referred to the jurisdiction of a gen-
eral court-martial, after a statutorily mandated investigation81 and
on the advice of the Staff Judge Advocate,82 the court is convened
pursuant to article 22 of the UCMJ.ss The court, consisting of a
minimum of five individuals, is selected by the commander con-
vening the court from among personnel in his command. Commis-
sioned officers are normally appointed to the court; however, an
enlisted member defendant can request that up to one-third of the
members of the court be appointed from the enlisted ranks." None
of the court members comes from the immediate military unit of
the accused and all members of the court have an equal vote re-
gardless of rank. The defense and prosecution each have one per-
emptory challenge and there is an unlimited number of challenges
for cause passed on by the military judge. Every general court-
martial is supervised by a military judge.85 The military judge per-
forms much the same function as a civilian trial judge. For exam-
ple, he or she decides questions of law, instructs the court mem-
bers on the applicable law, rules on all evidentiary questions and
generally administers the trial.
The accused at a general court-martial is guaranteed counsel
provided without cost by the military.8 6 Congress, echoing the 1938
81. See 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1979 & Supp. 1980) (art. 32-Investigation).
82. See id. § 834 (1979 & Supp. 1980) (art. 34-Advice of Staff Judge Advocate and
Reference for Trial).
83. Id. § 822 (1979 & Supp. 1980) (art. 22-Who May Convene General Courts-
Martial).
84. See id. § 825 (art. 25--Who May Serve on Courts-Martial). This note will not
consider the question of the fairness of the command appointing all members of the court.
There is a substantial amount of case law defining the rights and duties of a convening
authority vis-&-vis undue command influence. For an excellent discussion of this topic see R.
BROOKSHIRE, JuRoR SELECTION UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE: FACT AND
FICTION (1972); see also Scheisser, Trial by Peers-Enlisted Members of a Court-Martial,
15 CATH. U. L. REv. 171 (1966).
85. Military judges, according to article 26 of the UCMJ, are assigned to every general
court-martial. They are military attorneys, judge advocates, selected and trained as military
judges. Although under nominal local command they are functionally independent from the
local commander. Additionally, they can, according to the UCMJ, hear and decide cases
sitting alone when so requested by the accused. See 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1979 & Supp. 1980)
(art. 16-Courts-Martial Classified).
86. Id. § 827 (1979 & Supp. 1980) (art. 27-Detail of Trial Counsel and Defense Coun-
sel). See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Spring 1981] MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM 631
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Supreme Court case of Johnson v. Zerbst,87 recognized that the
average defendant, including the military defendant, does not have
the professional legal skill to provide an adequate defense88 and
thus the military provides counsel to the accused in general courts-
martial.
In a general court-martial the number of votes required for
conviction is determined by article 52 of the UCMJ.' The article
states that no person may be convicted of an offense for which the
penalty is mandatory death or be sentenced to death without a
unanimous verdict. Conviction of all other offenses requires a two-
thirds vote of the members of the court, and a sentence of ten
years imprisonment or more requires a vote of three-fourths of the
court-martial members.90 Therefore, according to the UCMJ, a
person subject to the jurisdiction of a general court-martial can be
convicted of a serious crime by a four to one vote of the court.
Guilty verdicts returned by all courts-martial are reviewed by
the convening authority pursuant to article 64 of the UCMJ.9 1 The
extra review is a uniquely military protection for the accused, as
the convening authority can only reduce the sentence, either par-
tially or entirely, or reject a finding of guilty by the court.92 This
extra review is in keeping with the military concept that a com-
mander has ultimate responsibility for the persons under his con-
trol, and the review is in addition to's any appellate review.94
IV. Jurisdictional Limitations on the Military
.Justice System
Although the Supreme Court has declined to address directly
the issue of the right to trial by jury in the military, the Court
since the adoption of the UCMJ has limited the jurisdiction of the
military justice system based in part on the lack of a constitution-
ally sufficient right to trial by jury in that system. These limita-
tions have narrowly construed the jurisdiction of the UCMJ with
87. Id.
88. Id. at 462-63.
89. 10 U.S.C. § 852 (1979) (art. 52-Number of Votes Required).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 864 (1979 & Supp. 1980) (art. 64-Approval by the Convening Authority).
92. Id.
93. In addition to a review by the convening authority there is a potential review by
the Court of Military Review (art. 66) and the Court of Military Appeals (art. 67).
94. See 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1979 & Supp. 1980) (art. 66-Review by Court of Military
Review), which makes mandatory a Court of Military Review review of all sentences of one
year or more.
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regard to civilian offenses committed in peacetime.
In 1955 the Court addressed the issue of whether a former
member of the armed forces was subject to trial under the UCMJ
for crimes committed while a member of the armed forces. The
Court, in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles 5 considered the
conviction by general court-martial of Robert W. Toth who had
been honorably discharged five months before his arrest and was
accused of committing a murder while an airman stationed in Ko-
rea. The military claimed jurisdiction over Toth because he had
committed the offense while a member of the armed forces.
The Court, rejecting the Government's argument, held that
former members of the armed forces, once discharged, are not sub-
ject to the UCMJ, even if their crime goes undiscovered until after
discharge.9 6 The Court noted that to hold otherwise would subject
a large percentage of the citizenry to potential imposition of mili-
tary justice, and it also noted that the result would be inconsistent
with the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
9 7
In Reid v. Covert,98 the Supreme Court considered the propri-
ety of military jurisdiction over civilian employees of the military
living overseas and civilian dependents living with the military
overseas. The case involved the consolidation of two similar cases
in which military dependents had killed their husbands, both
members of the armed forces, on overseas military posts. The mili-
tary had exercised jurisdiction according to the UCMJ and tried
them by general court-martial. The Court, after reviewing the his-
tory of the Fifth and the Sixth Amendments found that the defen-
dants were not subject to trial in the military justice system. Citing
Toth, the Court narrowly construed article I, section 8, clause 14,
95. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
96. Id. at 18-19.
97. Id. Interestingly, the Court noted in dicta that "military personnel because of their
training and experience may be especially competent to try soldiers for infractions of mili-
tary rules. Such training is no doubt particularly important where an offense charged
against a soldier is purely military, such as disobedience of an order, leaving post, etc." Id.
at 18. The recognition by the Court that for military offenses the military court may have
special expertise is worth noting when one considers the differentiation between military
and civilian offenses and the justification, that is special knowledge of the military situation,
put forth by the military for its adjudication of civilian offenses. See also United States ex
rel. Hirschberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949); United States v. Symonds, 120 U.S. 46, 49-50
(1887); United States v. Kelly, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 34, 36 (1872).
This raises an interesting jurisdictional question. Where can Toth be tried? He cannot
be tried in any district in the United States because the offense was committed in Korea
and assuming the victim was an American armed forces member, the Koreans would be
reluctant to exercise jurisdiction including extradition.
98. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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holding that the term "land and naval Forces" applied only to
members of the armed forces.99
The Court in Toth and Covert limited the jurisdiction of the
military justice'system to actual members of the armed forces. The
constitutional issue presented in the cases was relatively simple,
calling only for a narrow definition of the necessary and proper
clause and a common sense definition of the term "land and naval
Forces." The Court did not find it necessary in either case to ad-
dress the application of the Bill of Rights to the military justice
system. However, the Court did note in Reid that "[a]s yet it has
not been clearly settled to what extent the Bill of Rights and other
protective parts of the Constitution apply to military trials." 00 In
effect, the Court addressed the issue tangentially by limiting the
jurisdiction of the system.
In keeping with the trend established by United States ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles and Reid v. Covert, the Court addressed the issue
of the limits of military jurisdiction in the 1969 case of O'Callahan
v. Parker.'0 O'Callahan was a member of the armed forces, an
army sergeant, stationed on Oahu in what was then the Territory
of Hawaii. On a July evening in 1956, O'Callahan, dressed in civil-
ian clothes and in possession of a valid pass off-post, was arrested
by civilian authorities for assault and attempted rape of a fourteen
year old girl. He was subsequently tried and convicted of all
charges before a general court-martial and sentenced to ten years
imprisonment at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and allowances,
and given a dishonorable discharge. His conviction was affirmed by
the Army Board of Review and subsequently by the United States
Court of Military Appeals.02 While in the United States Peniten-
tiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania O'Callahan petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus.0 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
limited question of jurisdiction.
Again, as in Toth and Reid, the Court tangentially addressed
the right to trial by jury in the military by considering the jurisdic-
99. Id. at 19. See also McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281
(1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (holding that there is no military jurisdiction
for civilian employees overseas).
100. 354 U.S. at 37.
101. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
102. Id. at 260-61.
103. There is no direct right of appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of the
United States Court of Military Appeals. The United States Court of Military Appeals con-
sists of three civilian judges appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for
fifteen-year terms. The majority of military cases heard by the Supreme Court come to it
through a writ of habeas corpus filed by the appellant while in federal prison.
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tional limits of the military justice system. The O'Callahan opin-
ion, written by Justice Douglas, examined in great detail the his-
torical application of military justice. The Court noted that the
Constitution, article I, section 8, clause 14, recognized that "the
exigencies of military discipline require the existence of a special
system of military courts in which not all of the specific procedural
protections deemed essential in Art. III trials need apply."' ' The
Court went on further to distinguish military "tribunals" from ar-
ticle III courts: "Unlike courts, it is the primary business of armies
and navies to fight wars should the occasion arise. But trial of
soldiers to maintain discipline is merely incidental to an army's
primary fighting function."'105 The O'Callahan Court based the dis-
tinction between military "tribunals" and civilian courts on the
special need for discipline inherent in the military. Recognizing
that courts-martial are not conducted in strict compliance with the
Bill of Rights, the Court noted that the "justification for such a
system rests on the special needs of the military, and history
teaches that expansion of military discipline beyond its proper do-
main carries with it a threat to liberty.10
Having determined that discipline is the distinguishing factor
which allows the military justice system to deviate from constitu-
tional guarantees, the Court, quoting its opinion in Toth v.
Quarles, noted that: "[d]etermining the scope of the constitutional
power of Congress to authorize trial by court-martial presents an-
other instance calling for limitation to 'the least possible power
adequate to the end proposed." ,07 The Court concluded that for
an offense to be subject to military jurisdiction it must be "service
connected." 08 The Court specifically rejected the claim of the gov-
ernment that military jurisdiction was determined mainly by the
status of the individual; instead it determined that military juris-
diction depends also on the nature of the offenses committed by
members of the armed forces. "Status," the Court stated, "is nec-
essary for jurisdiction; but it does not follow that ascertainment of
'status' completes the inquiry, regardless of the nature, time, and
place of the offense."10 9 The Court determined that military juris-
diction attached only when the accused was a member of the
armed forces and the offense was "service connected"--that is, it
104. 395 U.S. at 261.
105. Id. at 262 (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)).
106. 395 U.S. at 265.
107. Id (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955)).
108. 395 U.S. at 272.
109. Id. at 267.
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necessarily impacted on military discipline.
In the O'Callahan case, the Court determined that the offense
was not service connected in that O'Callahan was legally off-post,
dressed in civilian clothes, and the victim was not a member of the
armed forces. Moreover, the Court noted that there was a civilian
court system capable of exercising jurisdiction. The Court noted
that an express grant of general power to Congress, like article I,
section 8, clause 14, should be "exercised in harmony with express
guarantees of the Bill of Rights" and that the offense committed
by O'Callahan could best be adjudged in keeping with the Bill of
Rights by a civilian court.110
The "service connected" standard adopted in O'Callahan v.
Parker was further defined in Relford v. Commandant."' In
Relford the Court held that two rapes committed by the accused
against civilians on-post were "service connected" and that the ac-
cused, a member of the armed forces, was properly tried before a
general court-martial.
The Court noted but rejected Relford's argument that
O'Callahan's requirement that the crime be "service connected"
demands that the crime itself be military in nature-that is, a
crime "involving a level of conduct required only of servicemen
and, because of the special needs of the military, one demanding
military disciplinary action,"" 2 and which is therefore "service
connected." 11 The Court, in an apparent step back from the
O'Callahan reasoning, held that the offenses were properly classi-
fied as "service connected." The Court cited several factors in sup-
port of its conclusion, most notably that the offenses were commit-
ted on-post and against victims properly on-post."" Additionally,
the Court noted that "It]he impact and adverse effect that a crime
committed against a person or property on a military base," 5 . . .
violating the base's very security. . . would be great upon the mo-
rale, discipline, reputation and integrity of the base itself, upon its
personnel and upon the military operation and the military mis-
sion."""' At the conclusion of its analysis the Court held that:
"[w]hen a serviceman is charged with an offense committed within
or at the geographical boundary of a military post and violative of
110. Id. at 273.
111. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
112. Id. at 363.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 366.




the security of a person or of property there, the offense may be
tried by court-martial."11
Covert and O'Callahan have limited the jurisdiction of the
military justice system. O'Callahan indicates that the military can
only infringe on constitutional protections in the name of disci-
pline. However, this is no longer clearly true after Relford.
O'Callahan v. Parker indicates that the protections are an is-
sue, but Relford v. Commandant backs away from that point by
giving a broad definition to discipline. Neither case considered the
next logical step. That is, whether the military justice system, as it
exercises jurisdiction on "service connected" civilian crimes in time
of peace, need act in accordance with constitutional standards. Put
another way, if one assumes, as the Court has, that "service con-
nected" civilian offenses committed by members of the armed
forces need to be tried by the military to accomplish its mission, is
it somehow necessary that the military not guarantee constitu-
tional protections? The Supreme Court has conveniently side-
stepped that issue in the jurisdiction cases and has never really
answered that question directly.
V. The Bill of Rights and Other Constitutional
Protections as Applied to the Military Justice
System
There are definitely two sides to the issue of the applicability
of constitutional protections to the military justice system. Some
claim that the military justice system is a constitutional sys-
tem-constitutional in that it draws its power from article I, sec-
tion 8, clause 14 of the Constitution, and as such is not bound by
the Bill of Rights or other constitutional guarantees. The argument
is further bolstered by the terms of the Fifth Amendment exclu-
sion, which provides for an exception "in cases arising in the land
or naval forces or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger."11 8
This argument relies primarily on dicta in an 1866 Civil War
decision, Ex parte Milligan.'" In that case Milligan, a citizen of
Indiana who had never been a member of the armed forces, was
arrested at his home by military authorities and tried "on certain
charges and specifications; found guilty, and sentenced to be
117. Id. at 369.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
119. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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hanged; and that sentence ordered to be executed on Friday, the
19th day of May, 1865."'120 The Court found that since Milligan
was living in a state not then in rebellion and had never been a
member of the armed forces, he was not liable to the jurisdiction of
the military courts.
In dicta the Court went on to explain the role of the right to
trial by jury in the military.
The Sixth Amendment affirms that "in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury," language broad enough to embrace all persons
and cases; but the [F]ifth, recognizing the necessity of an indict-
ment, or presentment, before any one can be held to answer for
high crimes "excepts cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war or public
danger;" and the framers of the Constitution, doubtless, meant to
limit the right of trial by jury, in the Sixth Amendment, to those
persons who were subject to indictment or presentment in the
Fifth.12
1
The Milligan Court based this rationale on the theory that the
"discipline necessary to the efficiency of the army and navy, re-
quired other and swifter modes of trial than are furnished by com-
mon law courts.1
122
The dicta in Milligan has often been cited by the Court of
Military Appeals, and many legal scholars, as an implicit dismissal
of the right to trial by jury in the military. 23 For example, in the
1963 case, United States v. Culp,22 4 the Court of Military Appeals
held that there was no such right on the basis that: "[t]he appar-
ently mandatory provision of the Sixth Amendment of trial by jury
is, when correctly interpreted, restricted by common law as it ex-
isted when the amendment was adopted, its contemporary inter-
pretation, and in light of the long-continued and consistent inter-
pretation thereof.
'1 25
The Court of Military Appeals again commented on the appli-
cability of the right to trial by jury in the military in United
120. Id. at 107.
121. Id. at 123.
122. Id.
123. See United States v. Culp, 14 C.M.A. 199, 207, 33 C.M.R. 411, 421-22 (1963); J.
BISHOP, JuSTIcE UNDER FIRE 140 (1974); Weiner, Courts-Martial and The Bill of Rights:
The Original Practice II, 72 Hmv. L. REv. 266, 294 (1958) (advocating the application of
constitutional guarantees). See also Cooper, The Sixth Amendment and Military Criminal
Law: Constitutional Protections and Beyond, 84 Mm.. L. REv. 41 (1979).
124. 14 C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
125. Id. at 209-10, 33 C.M.R. at 421-22.
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States v. Jenkins,126 noting that the right to trial by jury does not
apply to the military: "[I]t has been held that all Fifth and Sixth
Amendment guarantees do not apply to members of the armed
forces since said members do not have the right to indictment by
grand jury, nor trial by petit jury. "127
The argument comes full circle when one considers that the
quote appeared first in a footnote in Reid v. Covert quoting dicta
in a 1942 Supreme Court case, Ex parte Quirin,28 which relied in
part on the commonly cited and above-quoted dicta in Milligan.1
2
So there has never really been a clear decision by the Supreme
Court on the issue. There has been much comment in dicta by the
Supreme Court on the applicability of the Sixth Amendment's
right to trial by jury to the military justice system, but never a
decision on point. However, as late as 1973, the United States
Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Kemp,130 quoting Ex
parte Quirin and citing Ex parte Milligan, stated that there was
no right to trial by jury in the military justice system."'1 But this
rather unclear holding may indicate only that jury selection proce-
dures have no constitutional application in the military. In fact,
the clearest statements on record concerning the right to trial by
jury were made by the Naval Court of Military Review which held
in a 1977 case, United States v. Rice,13 2 that there was no right to
trial by jury for military accused, and by the Army Court of Mili-
tary Review which held in a 1978 case, United States v. Montgom-
ery,1 33 that the Supreme Court holding in Ballew v. Georgialu was
not applicable to the military justice system.
The argument in favor of applying the right to jury trial is
equally unclear. In the 1953 case of Burns v. Wilson,13 5 the Su-
preme Court, again in dicta, stated that the "military courts, like
the state courts, have the same responsibilities as do federal courts
to protect a person from a violation of his constitutional rights."'3 6
However, the Court declined to discuss those rights, - finding that
their inquiry was limited to considering whether the Court of Mili-
126. 20 C.M.A. 112, 42 C.M.R. 304 (1970).
127. Id. at 114, 42 C.M.R. at 306 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 n.68 (1957)).
128. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
129. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
130. 22 C.M.A. 152, 46 C.M.R. 153 (1973).
131. Id. at 154, 46 C.M.R. at 155.
132. 3 M.J. 1094 (N.C.M.R. 1977).
133. 5 M.J. 832 (A.C.1MLR. 1978).
134. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
135. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
136. Id. at 142.
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tary Appeals fairly heard the appellant's claims. The Court found
that it had and proceeded no further. Interestingly, and also in
dicta, the Court stated:
[M]ilitary law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists sepa-
rate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial
establishment. This Court has played no role in its development;
we have exerted no supervisory power over the courts which en-
force it; the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be
conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and
duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies which must deter-
mine the precise balance to be struck in this adjustment. The
Framers expressly entrusted that task to Congress.
13 7
Additionally, the Court of Military Appeals has also supported
the idea of the application of the Bill of Rights and other constitu-
tional protections to the military justice system. In Courtney v.
Williams, 8' the Court of Military Appeals held that "the burden
of showing that military conditions require a different rule than
that prevailing in the civilian community is upon the party arguing
for a different rule." 39 There the Court determined that the Fifth
Amendment's due process clause was applicable to the military
justice system.
About the clearest indication of the feeling of the Court of
Military Appeals is found in a note in a 1976 decision in United
States v. McCarthy.1 40 There the Court urged that "the perceived
fairness of the military justice system would be enhanced immeas-
urably by congressional reexamination of the presently utilized
jury selection process. 1 41 The Court of Military Appeals in Mc-
Carthy indicates some concern with the relevancy of the Sixth
Amendment to the military justice system. In 1978, the Court, in
United States v. Lamela,14 2 originally granted a petition for review
on the issue of the size of military juries; however, the Court later
vacated that grant.143 The Court of Military Appeals appears reluc-
tant to consider the question which they view as up to Congress to
decide.
137. Id. at 140. However, this dicta precedes the landmark decision in O'Callahan v.
Parker previously discussed in the text accompanying note 101 supra.
138. 1 M.J. 267 (C.M.A. 1976). The Courtney case involved the arbitrary prosecution
under one of two equally applicable UCMJ offenses with a great disparity of potential
sentences. However, the Court has declined to address the application of the Bill of Rights
and other constitutional protections to the military justice system.
139. Id. at 270.
140. 2 M.J. 26 (C.M.A. 1976).
141. Id. at 29 n.3.
142. 6 C.M.R. 11 (C.M.A. 1978).
143. 6 C.M.R. 32 (C.M.A. 1978).
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The question of the applicability of the total Bill of Rights to
the military remains unanswered. However, the recent cases of
O'Callahan v. Parker and Burns v. Wilson indicate that the Su-
preme Court considers some Bill of Rights and constitutional pro-
tections applicable to the military unless a showing can be made
that they are inconsistent with the preservation of discipline. It
appears that the Supreme Court is reluctant, as is the Court of
Military Appeals, to tamper with the long standing tradition in the
military justice system of independence from constitutional protec-
tions, based on article I, section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution,
despite the fact that there is no clear constitutional source for this
independence.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court of the United States has set a clear stan-
dard for a constitutionally sufficient trial by jury. The Court, de-
claring the right to a jury trial to be a fundamental right, has de-
termined that in a criminal case at least six jurors must
unanimously agree to conviction. The Court has determined that
less than six jurors voting for conviction does not provide justice
according to the Constitution. The standard for constitutionally
sufficient trial by jury has been applied to every jurisdiction in the
country save one: the military justice system.
The Court seems reluctant to apply the standard directly to
the military justice system. Most recent comments by the Court
indicate that the need for military discipline is the distinguishing
feature of the system. The Court seems reluctant to impose a stan-
dard on a system which, in addition to justice, has discipline as a
goal. However, the Court has not hesitated in limiting the exercise
of the military's jurisdiction. In O'Callahan v. Parker, the Court
rejected the "status" of the individual as the determinant of mili-
tary jurisdiction and held instead that military jurisdiction could
attach only to "service connected" offenses. Service connection was
further defined in Relford v. Commandant to include all military
offenses and any civilian offense committed on-post. The Court, in
limiting jurisdiction, was actually extending the protection of the
Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections to members of
the armed forces who committed crimes which did not directly af-
fect discipline.
But limiting the jurisdiction of the military justice system
seems to contradict the historical constitutional argument, first
seen in 1866 in Ex parte Milligan, that the military justice system
derives its power from Congress pursuant to article I, section 8,
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clause 14 of the Constitution and thus is absolute and not subject
to any constitutional constraints. The interpretation that supports
this view has a sound historical basis. Since its inception with the
Articles of War in 1797, the military justice system has functioned
under the absolute grant of congressional authority. Additionally,
the Court's support of this concept allows the Court to avoid the
issue of the application of the right to trial by jury entirely, or at
least gives the Court the option of considering the issue tangen-
tially through the limitations on the military's jurisdiction-an
easy and clean operation.
Certainly the importance of discipline as a goal of the military
justice system deserves recognition, and the Court cannot be
faulted for leaving the imposition of discipline to the military.
However, one must balance the importance of discipline against
the harm resulting from deprivation of constitutional protections.
The Supreme Court has done this to a degree in O'Callahan where
it found the discipline argument too remote to justify imposition of
military justice on nonservice connected offenses. The Court in
Burns v. Wilson also stressed in dicta, that the Bill of Rights must
be heavily weighted in the balance.
Given the finding of the Court in the Duncan v. Louisiana line
of cases and the trend of the Court to limit the jurisdiction of the
military justice system to service connected offenses, the Court
should decide which if any constitutional protections need be sur-
rendered to foster discipline in an armed forces of over two million
citizens. It seems reasonable that military offenses, which by their
nature have a direct impact on discipline, should be viewed differ-
ently from civilian offenses, which do not have so direct an effect
on discipline. When the latter are at issue, the system should be
held to a closer constitutional standard.
It seems logical to extend the right of trial by jury to members
of the armed forces in the case of civilian offenses committed in a
time of peace. Such an integration of the right to trial by jury into
the military justice system would provide both justice and disci-
pline. Allowing the convening authority to select jurors, but requir-
ing that once selected, the courts-martial should meet the constitu-
tional standard of at least six members voting for conviction would
place the military justice system in conformance with recent Su-
preme Court holdings and would ensure a constitutionally suffi-
cient trial by jury. Also, discipline would not appreciably suffer if
the size and voting requirements were changed to reflect these con-
stitutional strictures. Members of the armed forces would still be
tried by the military and by those superior in rank and the power
[VoL 8:617
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from which the court is convened would still be the military com-
mand structure.
It seems inequitable to grant an accused most constitutional
protections, including the right to counsel, during a military trial
and then in the name of discipline to allow a conviction to take
place in a manner which would be found, in a civilian context, to
be both unjust and unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court. Where, in the case of civilian offenses committed in time of
peace, discipline is so indirectly affected, the military justice sys-
tem should provide a constitutionally sufficient right to trial by
jury.

